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Abstract
We analyze cooperation within a company setting in order to study the relationship
between cooperative attitudes and financial as well as non-financial rewards. In to-
tal, 910 employees of a large software company participate in an incentivized online
experiment. We observe high levels of cooperation and the typical conditional con-
tribution patterns in a modified public goods game. When linking experiment and
company record data, we observe that cooperative attitudes of employees do not pay
off in terms of financial rewards within the company. Rather, cooperative employees
receive non-financial benefits such as recognition or friendship as the main reward
medium. In contrast to most studies in the experimental laboratory, sustained levels
of cooperation in our company setting relate to non-financial values of cooperation
rather than solely to financial incentives.
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1 Introduction
Within organizations most processes and production steps entail voluntary cooperation
among employees to realize optimal output. This is particularly true for teamwork, but
also for other daily interactions like helping or knowledge sharing (see Gittell, 2000; Fehr,
2018), where cooperation requires solving a social dilemma: those involved are better off
if everybody provided high levels of effort or lots of time, but due to the individual incen-
tive to contribute the enforceable minimum, the joint product is provided on a suboptimal
scale, or not at all.
Social dilemmas have been studied extensively in the experimental laboratory (for re-
views see Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018) as well as in
the context of governing the commons in the field (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Rustagi et al., 2010;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2016). Interestingly, there is much less empirical
evidence on cooperation within organizations, and, in particular, companies.1 They often
have to solve a general tradeoff between creating a cooperative culture in order to pro-
vide internal public goods on an efficient level and securing a competitive environment
in order to induce innovation and to be able to select the best employees for promotion.
Striking the balance, given the tension between cooperation and competition, is probably
one of the most difficult management tasks (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).
A key aspect of cooperation within organizations is that employees and teams often
interact repeatedly. While reputation concerns and informal peer sanctioning can reduce
the free-rider problem, they are often unable to solve social dilemmas fully (e.g., Fis-
chbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010).2 Thus, even in repeated interaction and with peer sanction-
ing mechanisms in place, it is essential for companies to establish a cooperative culture in
order to sustain high levels of cooperation over time, avoiding the often observed decay
in cooperation.
In this paper, we exploit a unique setting for studying how financial and non-financial
reward instruments within organizations relate to the cooperative culture among employ-
ees. Understanding this relationship entails relevant implications for many organizations.
Our analysis is based on incentivized online experiments with 910 employees of a large
software company.3 We link data on the level of the employee from these experiments
1Notable exceptions are Charness and Villeval (2009) and Burks et al. (2009).
2Among other reasons, decreasing cooperation levels in repeated interaction result from contractual
incompleteness of cooperative behavior (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Itoh, 1991), the existence of imperfectly
conditional cooperators (see Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010; Ambrus and Pathak, 2011) or imperfect sanc-
tioning mechanisms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Houser et al., 2008; Nikiforakis,
2008).
3Following the typology of Harrison and List (2004) our experiments can be referred to as an “artefac-
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that measure cooperative attitudes in variants of the public goods game (see Fischbacher
et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010) with reward and context variables from com-
pany records.
Our setup allows for three main contributions. Firstly, we can systematically provide
evidence on the association between cooperative attitudes and financial rewards within
the company, while being able to control for determinants of cooperation whose relevance
is suggested by economic theory. Secondly, we can assess potential non-financial reasons
for cooperation in a natural environment that have so far almost exclusively been studied
in the experimental laboratory. Thirdly, our study fulfills a methodological purpose by
assessing the external validity for a business context of one of the most frequently applied
laboratory measures of cooperation.4
With respect to our first contribution, we find that cooperativeness of employees does
not lead to higher individual financial rewards. In stark contrast, our estimates show that
within our study period from 2016 to 2018, cooperative employees received on average
29% lower annual wage increases and 15% lower financial award payments than their
more selfish colleagues. Being cooperative is not rewarded in terms of remuneration.
Regarding our second contribution, we observe that a large fraction of employees ex-
hibits comparatively high levels of cooperation, despite the financial disincentives and
the existence of selfish employees. Hence, in contrast to laboratory experiments, in which
opportunistic cooperation is usually observed by selfish players in repeated cooperation
that leads to a quick decay of contributions over time, we observe a potentially stable
pattern of cooperation in the company. Consequently, behavior in the field experiment
and observational data form the company together suggest that there must be substantial
non-financial rewards of cooperation for the cooperators. Otherwise, cooperation should
break down over time. While our online experiment features a one-shot interaction and
thus cannot observe contribution dynamics, the high share of perfect conditional coop-
erators and the substantial number of unconditional cooperators provide the basis for
stable cooperation.
We find supportive evidence for this interpretation when linking experimental data
with record data from a non-financial recognition tool that employees can access via
the company’s intranet. Cooperative employees receive 51% more recognition awards
from their colleagues. In a similar vein, we find that cooperative employees and teams
tual field experiment”. Alternatively, one could call it a “lab-in-the-field experiment” (Gneezy and Imas,
2017).
4There is an active methodological discussion about the generalizability/external validity of standard
laboratory measures (see Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Burks et al., 2016; Gneezy and
Imas, 2017).
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comprised of a larger share of cooperative employees report stronger team cohesion and
higher work satisfaction in our post-experimental survey, which is again a sign for non-
financial reward components of a cooperative environment.
Regarding our third contribution, we document that cooperative employees send more
than twice as many recognition awards than selfish employees. This correlation corrobo-
rates the external validity of cooperative attitudes measured in our experiments as send-
ing an award requires some individual cost to write a justification and induces a positive
externality on a co-worker.
Overall, our data is indicative of the idea that the company positively affects levels of
cooperation through supplying non-financial compensating differentials to cooperative
employees.5 This is our preferred interpretation of the data, because it provides a joint
mechanism for (i) high levels of cooperation, (ii) a negative nexus between financial re-
wards and cooperativeness, and (iii) a positive nexus between non-financial rewards and
cooperativeness. We also investigate three other mechanisms that are likely to be present
in our setting, but that are unlikely to be the sole driver of our three findings: an omit-
ted variable bias related to performance or skills that are specific to cooperative attitudes
(Bowles et al., 2001; Barr et al., 2009; Leibbrandt, 2012), selection based on cooperative at-
titudes (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011), and context-dependent pref-
erences (Bowles, 1998; Levitt and List, 2007; Cohn et al., 2014).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first relate our study to the
literature on artefactual field experiments to study cooperation in the field. In Section
3, we outline the company setting at hand. In Section 4, we describe our experimental
setup and the data for our analysis. Then, we report the correlation between cooperative
attitudes and relevant outcome variables from the company context in Section 5. Section
6 discusses the main findings and potential underlying mechanisms. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Related Literature
It is impossible to do justice to the large experimental literature on cooperation, even
if one restricts attention to (artefactual) field experiments and lab experiments predicting
prosocial behavior outside the laboratory (for a survey see Galizzi and Navarro-Martı´nez,
2019). Examples for field experiments on cooperation are List and Lucking-Reiley (2002),
5This interpretation is in line with a strand of literature that emphasizes an intrinsic value of cooperation
beyond its financial consequences (Hamilton et al., 2003; Bandiera et al., 2005, 2011, 2013; Ruff and Fehr,
2014).
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Cardenas (2003), Frey and Meier (2004), Alpizar et al. (2008), Benz and Meier (2008), Burks
et al. (2009), Carpenter and Seki (2011), Croson and Shang (2008), Charness and Villeval
(2009), Rustagi et al. (2010), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), Voors et al. (2011, 2012), Stoop et
al. (2012), or Gneezy et al. (2014, 2016). People have studied charitable giving, fishermen,
truck drivers, visitors of national parks and many more. However, there is very little
evidence on company settings.
Regarding our main research interest, the financial and non-financial rewards of coop-
erative attitudes of employees in a company there is particularly scarce existing empirical
evidence from the field. This is despite an abundance of case studies and anecdotical evi-
dence on firms that must balance cooperative and competitive elements in their incentive
schemes or that must foster cooperation within teams to be successful (e.g., Dirks, 1999;
Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Gratton, 2009, 2011; Grant, 2013). Beersma et al. (2003) discuss
the relevant management literature and provide a study on the cooperation/competition
tradeoff, including personality differences and task characteristics.
In the following, we provide an upshot of the existing literature on our three main con-
tributions. Our first contribution is on the association between cooperative attitudes and
financial rewards within the company. Burks et al. (2009) use a naturally occurring social
dilemma among bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Their focus is
on the selection of messengers into companies based on incentive schemes. Workers in
companies that pay for performance show less cooperation than workers in companies
that pay fixed hourly wages or that are members of cooperatives.
There is more closely related literature in other than a standard workplace domain (or
using other paradigms than the standard public goods game) that can still inform our
setup. Leibbrandt (2012) compares behavior of professional shrimp sellers in a labora-
tory public goods game with natural market outcomes. He finds a positive relationship
between cooperativeness and market success as measured by achieving higher prices for
shrimps and establishing longer lasting trade relations. He argues that the detected corre-
lation is driven by cooperative employees being able to signal trustworthiness. Similarly,
Essl et al. (2018) study the trustworthiness of sales employees of an Austrian retail chain
using a modified trust game and relate behavior in the game to individual sales perfor-
mance data. The authors find that higher trustworthiness is associated with lower sales
per day, but with higher revenue per customer. Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) look at
experimental measures of cooperation and link them to household expenditures in Viet-
nam and Thailand, showing that more cooperative individuals are better off. Likewise,
Barr and Serneels (2009) provide evidence that experimentally elicited trustworthiness is
positively related to wages of manufacturing workers in Ghana.
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Regarding the relationship between cooperative attitudes and non-financial rewards –
our second contribution – there again exists limited evidence. Ruff and Fehr (2014) sum-
marize evidence from laboratory FMRI studies that indicate “[...] an experienced value
of cooperation per se that might bias individuals to display cooperative behavior” (p.
557). In the field, Hamilton et al. (2003) show that workers at a garment plant volun-
tarily select into a team-based work organization despite financial losses as compared to
performing sewing tasks individually. They argue that such selection behavior is likely
driven by non-financial reasons such as hedonic benefits from team work. In a similar
vein, Bandiera et al. (2005, 2011, 2013) find that UK fruit pickers increase efforts or forgo
financial benefits due to social ties to co-workers.
Our third contribution relates to the external validity of experimentally elicited coop-
erative attitudes. While we know quite a lot on the external validity of different measures
on uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and time preferences, we know much less
on the external validity of standard measures of cooperative attitudes. Existing studies
that provide evidence of the external validity of the standard linear public goods game,
i.e., the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), are mainly linked to the problem of
the commons. Rustagi et al. (2010) elicit cooperative attitudes of members of 49 forest
user groups in Ethiopia in an artefactual field experiment setting. They link cooperative
attitudes to natural forest commons outcomes and find that groups that are comprised of
a larger number of conditional cooperators are doing a better job in managing the forest
commons. In a similar vein, Gneezy et al. (2016) study Brazilian fishermen who are or-
ganized differently in different places regarding the need for team work. Fishermen at
the sea who are forced to work in teams cooperate and trust more than their counterparts
at lakes who mostly work individually (see also, for instance, Carpenter and Seki, 2011;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Stoop et al., 2012; Voors et al., 2011, 2012).
Evidence for contexts, apart from common pool management, is provided by Burks et
al. (2016) who conduct prisoner’s dilemma experiments with truck drivers. More coop-
erative truck drivers are found to send satellite uplink messages from their trucks more
frequently (messages are costly but benefit an anonymous colleague). Englmaier and
Gebhardt (2016) perform a lab-field comparison by inviting student participants to a lab-
oratory public goods game and to a natural work setting (registering books in a library
database) in which incentives condition on team outcomes. From the positive correla-
tion of behavior in the laboratory and in the natural work task, the authors conclude that
the laboratory public goods game captures important aspects of structurally equivalent
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situations outside the laboratory.6
Our study adds the novel elements of a work team and company setting and the link
of financial as well as non-financial outcome data with behavioral data from incentivized
experiments to the existing literature in economics and management.
3 The Company Setting
We conduct our study in partnership with a large, multinational software company. About
40% of the employees work as software developers, 40% work in the sales and consulting
area, and the remaining 20% work in more general service areas like Human Resources,
Accounting & Finance or Marketing. Several institutional features are important to un-
derstand how the company and its reward systems operate.
Business Models. Most individual and teamwork tasks in the company are mainly tak-
ing place in either a customer business model or cloud business model. The customer
model uses servers that are on the premise of the client and that are serviced by com-
pany employees, whereas the cloud business model uses internet cloud solutions that
concurrently apply to many clients. According to our discussions with managers of the
company before conducting the study, the latter model requires more cooperation among
workers at the software producer than the former; in other words, it entails a production
function with much more pronounced complementarities (for instance, between software
development and consulting).7 Interestingly, due to the cloud model connecting several
software products on an interface, sales employees also have sales bags that are com-
prised of items that, if sold, positively affect the performance of their sales team, i.e. other
team members.
Pay Schemes. Employees are enrolled in one of two co-existing pay schemes: either the
company performance or the individual performance pay scheme. Both schemes involve
a fixed component and a variable pay component. They differ in how the variable pay
component is determined. In the company performance pay scheme, employees receive
6As in our study, Charness and Villeval (2009) deploy a linear public goods game in actual companies,
but they focus on the difference in behavior of junior and senior employees. The main finding is that senior
employees are more cooperative than junior employees. Von Bieberstein et al. (2020) analyze student per-
formance in math exams and partner work assignments at university using public goods game measures,
however, they find no correlation (but free-riders are performing better in the exam).
7For validation, we ask all participants how important cooperation is to successfully fulfill their indi-
vidual and teamwork tasks on a standard Likert scale in an online survey. We detect a strong correlation be-
tween the business models and responses to the survey question (Spearman correlation: −0.214, p < 0.001).
While 42% of employees state that teamwork is of high importance in the cloud business model only 24%
do so in the customer business model (t-test, p < 0.001).
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bonus payments that are determined by the overall company performance. Under the
individual performance pay, bonuses depend on individual performance assessments.
Enrollment in either of these schemes is tied to job roles such that selection is only pos-
sible via job choice. While all developers and employees in the service areas work un-
der the company performance pay, most sales employees work under individual perfor-
mance pay. Consultants are equally likely working in either of the schemes depending on
whether they are in-house or outgoing consultants.
Wages. The employees’ target wage consists of a base wage and the bonus conditional
on full target achievement (either company or individual target). This means that the tar-
get wage does not necessarily correspond to the actual wage payed. However, analyses
by the company show that the target wage is a good proxy for actual wages, hence, we
refer to them as wages.8 Cross-sectional variation in wages is mainly due to jobs at differ-
ent career levels or in different functions. Variations in the wage levels over time reflect
job trajectories. For example, this includes promotions or other internal job changes that
relate to a different pay mix. In addition, managers have a budget for merit increases paid
to their employees to be decided upon on a yearly basis.
Financial Awards. Another important reward instrument of managers is the conferral of
financial awards. At the end of a year, every manager can allocate financial awards that
consist of shares of the company among employees in his/her team. An award conferred
in a particular year is paid out in three tranches in the subsequent years. The budget is
fixed for each year for the whole company and on team levels. The award guidelines
handed out to the managers specify the idea of a financial award as recognizing employ-
ees that are important for the success of the company and as an instrument for employee
retention. The guidelines apply to all departments, job positions and both pay schemes.
Recognition Awards. Furthermore, there exists a non-financial recognition system that
every employee can easily access via the company’s intranet. The program is an institu-
tionalized way to thank a colleague for several desired behaviors including, for example,
cooperation, promise keeping, or embracing diversity. If an employee receives an award,
he/she is notified via e-mail. The e-mail prominently shows a slogan such as “Thank you
for being cooperative!” (or the relevant other award justification). It also contains a mes-
sage from the sending employee and his/her name. The receiving employee’s manager
can see every award and the total number of awards received for each team member. The
8In the company performance scheme, there was full target achievement over the relevant years; hence,
target wages equal the wages payed. In the individual performance pay, target wage is a noisier measure of
the actual wage payed. While on average there are very high target achievement rates (on average, above
100%), there is a higher standard deviation.
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role of the manager is also to prevent employees from sending awards back and forth.
There are no direct financial consequences related to a recognition award, neither for the
sending nor for the receiving employee. However, sending an award requires some effort
as it must be justified in a text of at least 150 characters.
4 Experimental Setup and Data
Our analyses are based on data from three different sources. First, we collect data from an
incentivized online experiment. Second, in a subsequent survey module, we elicit a vari-
ety of control variables such as socio-demographic characteristics or behavioral measures
that relate to cooperation. The gathered data is then merged with reward and context
variables from the company records on the individual level. An overview of all collected
variables can be found in Appendix A.
4.1 Behavioral Measure of Cooperative Attitudes
The first part is a public goods experiment according to the “ABC-framework of cooper-
ation” (Ga¨chter et al., 2017).9 It uses the design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), including the
elicitation of beliefs. In a VCM setting, we elicit an unconditional contribution to a pub-
lic good, a full contribution schedule contingent on average contributions of other group
members, and subjects’ beliefs about others’ average unconditional contributions.
Participants are randomly assigned to groups of three. Every participant knows that all
other participants are randomly selected employees of the company. Each group member
receives an initial endowment of 10 Tokens to be allocated to a private account or to
be contributed to a public account. One Token equals e1. The invested amount ci ∈
{0, 1, ..., 10} is referred to as the unconditional contribution. The sum of all contributions
to the public good is multiplied 1.5 in our case, and divided equally among all n = 3
group members. This leads to the following payoff function for subject i:
pii = 10− ci + γ
n
∑
j=1
cj (1)
which is linear in the public good contribution and where ci denotes the contribution
of group member i. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing in the public
good is 1/n < γ = 0.5 < 1. From an individual perspective, free-riding (i.e., ci = 0) is a
9The instructions of the public goods game can be found in Appendix B. The full experimental material
provided to employees can be found in the Online Appendix.
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dominant strategy. Since the sum of marginal returns is larger than 1, however, contribut-
ing the entire endowment (i.e., ci = 10) is the optimal choice from a collective perspective.
The decision is made only once and anonymously. Thus, there are no incentives and no
possibilities to build a reputation.
Participants do not receive any feedback after indicating an unconditional contribu-
tion. Subsequently, participants are asked to fill in a contribution table indicating their
contribution for each possible average contribution of the other group members, rounded
up to integers. The conditional contributions from the contribution table allow us to clas-
sify three distinct cooperative attitudes. We depart from the existing literature for ex-
positional reasons; the interpretation of our analysis is simplified when using the three
categories. Fischbacher et al. (2001) and many follow-up papers classify free riders (zero
contributions, regardless of the average contributions of others), conditional cooperators
(increasing contributions with increasing average contributions of others), and hump-
shaped contributors (increasing contributions with increasing average contributions of
others up to a certain contribution level, and above decreasing contributions with in-
creasing average contributions of others). Since we additionally observe a significant
number of perfect conditional contributors (those who match the average contributions
of others perfectly) and even some unconditional full contributors (contributing the max-
imum amount of ten Tokens regardless of the average contribution of others), we use the
following classification:
• Net-Taker: We classify an employee whose average conditional contribution is sma-
ller than five Tokens as a Net-Taker. This means that the employee, on average,
free-rides (at least partially) on the contribution of others to the public good (mainly
free riders, conditional cooperators with a self-serving bias10).
• Net-Giver: An employee that contributes more than five Tokens is defined as a Net-
Giver. The employee, on average, contributes more than the two others (mainly
conditional cooperators with an other-serving bias, unconditional full contributors).
• Matcher: An employee who, on average, exactly matches the average contribution
of the two other members is considered a Matcher (almost equivalent to perfect
conditional cooperators).11
10These are conditional cooperators that have an increasing contribution schedule, but they, on average,
contribute less than the average of other members.
11Our main results are robust to using different definitions of cooperative attitudes. Details are provided
in the results section and in the Appendix.
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To make both the unconditional and the conditional contributions incentive-compati-
ble, we use the mechanisms described in Fischbacher et al. (2001). That is, for one ran-
domly selected subject the conditional contributions are payoff-relevant, whereas for the
two remaining subjects the unconditional contribution is to determine the average con-
tribution of other group members. We also elicit expected contributions of others in an
incentivized way. Following Ga¨chter and Renner (2010), participants are asked to guess
the average unconditional contribution of the other group members and receivee5 if they
are correct, otherwise they receive e0.
4.2 Survey and Company Variables
After the incentivized parts, we elicit additional variables that are relevant for the analy-
sis of the determinants and the context of cooperation without using monetary incentives.
Importantly, we ask whether an employee’s individual and teamwork tasks are mainly
related to the customer or the cloud business model. In addition, we capture personal-
ity traits (a short form of the Big Five; Rammstedt et al. (2013)), and survey measures
of related social preference concepts like negative/positive reciprocity (Falk et al., 2018)
and trust (Anderson et al., 2004). We also elicit a measure of individual competitive at-
titude (i.e., the competitiveness index as introduced by Newby and Klein (2014)) and
basic socio-demographic variables (such as nationality, education, and number of kids
and friends). Furthermore, variables with respect to perceived team cohesion (Ashforth
and Mael, 1989), team stability, and work-related stress (Schulz and Schlotz, 1999) are
elicited.12
We combine the elicited data with a rich data set from the company. On the employee
level, this includes age, gender, seniority (years employed at the company), career levels,
and personal leadership responsibilities. Using a work team identifier, we can also in-
fer information about team compositions (for example, with respect to gender and age).
Regarding reward institutions, we have individual level information on the employees’
pay scheme, his/her wage level, and the value of financial award payments. Observing
employees’ wage levels over time allows us to calculate annual wage increases. We addi-
tionally observe the numbers of recognition awards received and sent for each employee.
12After the main public goods game, we also use incentivized coordination games and short social
dilemma vignettes to elicit the shared perception of cooperative norms that prevail in the company (com-
pare to Burks and Krupka, 2012). This provides us with a better understanding of the “cooperative culture”
in the company. For an extensive discussion of these norm elicitations and the respective empirical results
refer to Deversi et al. (2020).
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4.3 Procedures
We conducted the described experimental and survey modules online.13 Eligible em-
ployees received a personalized participation link. Every respondent knew that he/she
can complete the experiment within a two-weeks period. There were two roll-out phases
with different employees, the first in November 2017 and the second in February 2019.
Employees could participate during regular work hours. The total completion of the ex-
periment and the survey took about 30 minutes and could be interrupted at any time.
The online experiment did not require participants to simultaneously make decisions.
Participants were informed that groups were assembled randomly ex post. Since nobody
received feedback during the experiment, such a procedure is equivalent to simultane-
ously entered decisions. Participants could use their personal ID code to login after the
roll-out phase had ended to get feedback on the results. We asked participants to perform
the online experiment individually. The random and anonymous allocation to groups
made sure that coalition formation among group members when filling in the online ex-
periment was impossible.14
Before a participant could decide about the public good contributions, he/she needed
to answer comprehension questions on the game. If an answer was wrong, the participant
was notified and was shown the correct answer to be re-entered in the respective input
box. We set up a telephone hotline and an e-mail address for potential questions during
the experiment. We received very few calls and messages.
In the first roll-out phase in 2017, we implemented an unexpected donation option
at the end of the experiment as a control for social desirability concerns. In 2019, we
included an additional public goods game (administered in a within-subject fashion) that
varied the MPCRs (either very high, 1.2, or very low, 0.3) to check whether participants
would react to changes in the social dilemma characteristics. Notice that an MPCR of
1.2 makes it individually optimal to contribute, whereas an MPCR of 0.3 makes it both
individually and social optimal not to contribute.
Individual data from the company was de-identified before linking it to our elicited
data. The data collection and storage were facilitated through Qualtrics. There exists a
data protection agreement between the company and Qualtrics; and a research agreement
13Our study represents one of many studies and surveys that employees fill out at the company. The
company even has its own survey team. Hence, asking employees to participate in an online study while
being at their workplaces is nothing unusual, although the incentivized experimental part was of course
somewhat special to most employees.
14It was extremely unlikely that (matched) participants would be sitting in a shared office. Analyses of
the participants’ start and end times suggest that there was no communication or coordination of employees
of a work team (for the analysis see Appendix C).
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(including data protection) between the company and the research team. Data protection
units at the company, at University of Munich and University of Heidelberg supervised
the study. The company did not receive individual-level data, and all participants were
informed about the full pseudonymization of their responses before the experiment. The
data protection at the company was only to be involved in determining the exact proce-
dures, not in handling the linked data. We made sure that the pseudonymized final data
set was only stored on the computers of the researchers involved in this project within
university fire-walls.
Employees were aware of the data protection procedures and provided informed con-
sent before participating in the study. Ethics approval by the University of Munich was
granted in September 2017. The study was pre-registered at the AEA registry (AEARCTR-
0002596). The respective pre-analysis plan was slightly updated and re-submitted before
the second round of experiments took place in 2019.
4.4 Sample and Selection
We invited 2,799 employees from 371 work teams to participate in our study.15 This in-
cludes 1,297 employees invited in 2017 and 1,502 employees invited in 2019. We randomly
selected teams that had between 8-20 team members of which more than 70% were based
in the German-speaking area.
Overall, 910 employees from 299 teams participated.16 This corresponds to a partici-
pation rate of about 32.5%. The characteristics of the participating employees are mostly
representative for the employee population at the company (conditional on the invita-
tion requirements) as can be seen in Table 1. There does not seem to be any selection
bias into the experiment based on observable characteristics. However, compared to non-
participating employees, participating employees less frequently work under the indi-
vidual performance pay scheme (26% versus 22%). Almost all participating employees
are placed in the German-speaking area (99% versus 98% in the invited sample). We did
not receive wage data for 57 participating employees. These data were either secret, from
15In 2019, we excluded working students and temporarily employed consultants from invitations. Also,
in 2017, we slightly oversampled employees from the individual performance pay scheme to have a larger
comparison group. There was limited record data availability for these employees in 2017. Working stu-
dents and external employees were not eligible to participate in award programs and worked under special
fixed wage contracts. Hence, we decided to exclude these groups of employees from the second round of
experiments in 2019.
16We count an employee’s response as a full response if more than 90% of the questions were answered.
Herewith we exclude 414 employees that answered on average only 9.8% of the questions – which corre-
sponds to the first screen of the public goods game instructions.
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Non-Participating Employees Participating Employees
Count Mean SD Count Mean SD P-Value
Socio-Demographics
Female 1889 0.30 0.46 910 0.30 0.46 0.965
Age 1889 45.09 8.95 910 44.48 9.31 0.276
Company Controls
Seniority 1889 14.33 7.34 910 14.03 7.47 0.292
Team Size 1889 13.60 3.54 910 13.78 3.48 0.264
Leader 1889 0.09 0.29 910 0.10 0.30 0.571
Career Level
Low 231 0.12 0.33 111 0.12 0.33 0.993
Medium 1430 0.76 0.43 683 0.75 0.43 0.762
High 228 0.12 0.33 116 0.13 0.33 0.686
Indv. Performance Pay 1772 0.26 0.44 866 0.22 0.41 0.031
German Area 1889 0.98 0.01 910 0.99 0.01 0.041
Outcome Variables
Recognition Awards
Reception 1892 0.29 0.89 910 0.26 0.61 0.823
Sending 1892 0.21 1.51 910 0.22 1.19 0.623
Wage 1779 . . 853 . . 0.217
Wage Increase 1774 0.044 0.078 846 0.045 0.086 0.154
Financial Awards 1774 0.058 0.057 873 0.061 0.055 0.150
N 1889 910
Table 1: Sample Selection
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests for continuous variables or χ2-tests for categor-
ical variables. For reasons of discretion, we do not provide wage level statistics here. However, there is
no significant difference in wage levels between participants and non-participants. Career levels subsume
several actual categories in each presented category. Financial awards are denominated in percent of wages.
working students or external employees, or were not available to the company’s German
human resources department that we worked with to retrieve the data from the records.
More generally, one might expect sample selection according to the unobserved level of
cooperativeness of employees. Cooperative employees could more frequently volunteer
to participate in surveys/experiments, which could bias our results and interpretations.
First, this is not so much of a concern, given that we are not interested in the level of
cooperation, but in the link between cooperation and company outcomes. Second, as a
robustness check, we show in Section 5.2 that given a high correlation between, for exam-
ple, recognition award sending and cooperativeness, we do not find any evidence for the
systematic selection into our experiments based on cooperative attitudes. The significant
correlates of cooperativeness are statistically indistinguishable between participating and
non-participating employees.
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5 Results
5.1 Cooperative Attitudes
About 24% (N=201) of the employees can be classified as Net-Takers, i.e., they contribute
on average less than five Tokens (mean of 2.51 Tokens) in the conditional contribution de-
cisions. We classify 35% (N=345) as Net-Givers who contribute on average more than five
Tokens (mean of 7.23 Tokens). Around 41% (N=364) of the employees exhibit a contribu-
tion pattern best described by Matcher behavior, which implies an average contribution
of exactly five Tokens.17
Table 2 presents an overview of the collected public goods measures for each of the
three cooperative types. Overall the unconditional contribution decisions reveal very
high cooperation levels (79% of the endowment), despite the existence of Net-Takers. Net-
Takers contribute significantly less unconditionally than Matchers and Net-Givers (5.44
versus 8.41 and 8.77, respectively; Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests, both p-values< 0.001).
They also expect lower unconditional contributions from their colleagues (4.54 versus 7.30
and 7.32, respectively; MWU tests, both p-values< 0.001). Differences between Matchers
and Net-Givers are not statistically significant (MWU tests; unconditional contributions,
p = 0.876; beliefs, p = 0.436).
All Net-Takers Matchers Givers
(N=910) (N=201) (N=364) (N=345)
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Unconditional contributions 7.89 2.93 5.44 3.54 8.41 2.58 8.77 1.96
Belief about others’ contributions 6.70 2.78 4.54 2.79 7.30 2.57 7.32 2.34
Mean conditional contribution 5.30 2.25 2.51 1.76 5.00 0.00 7.23 1.77
Slope parameter 0.71 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.95 0.24 0.59 0.45
Table 2: Overview of Public Goods Game Variables by Cooperative Attitudes
Following Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010), we estimate each employee’s slope param-
eter from a linear regression of the conditional contribution and the contribution sched-
ule.18 The average slope parameter is 0.71, which reflects a tendency to conditioning own
17We observe similar distributions of cooperative attitudes comparing the experimental waves in 2017
and 2019 (Komoglorov-Smirnov Test, p = 1.000). This also holds for the other public goods game variables.
Hence, for the period of our study, we regard the cooperation pattern in the company as stable and pool
the data whenever possible.
18If the slope parameter is equal to 1, all contributions of the employee coincide with the average contri-
bution of the other two group members, i.e., there is a perfect linear relationship between their contribution
and the contributions of the others (perfect conditional cooperation). If the parameter decreases the rela-
tionship becomes weaker, such that a value of 0 means that contributions are independent of the others’
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contributions on others’ contributions. The Net-Takers’ average slope parameter equals
0.46 and is lower than the parameters of the other two attitude types (MWU tests, both
p-values< 0.001). While the Matchers’ slope parameter is almost 1 (mean of 0.95), reflect-
ing that most of these employees are perfectly conditionally cooperative, the Net-Givers
have a slope parameter of 0.59, which lies between the other two attitude types (MWU
tests, all p-values < 0.001).19
5.2 Recognition Awards and Cooperative Attitudes
Figure 1 relates the number of received (left) and sent (right) recognition awards per em-
ployee to cooperative attitudes. We observe that Net-Givers act more cooperatively and
are also recognized as such. They sent more than 2.5 times as many recognition awards
and receive about 40% more than their colleagues (MWU tests, pooling Net-Takers and
Matchers, p = 0.057 and p = 0.039, respectively). The difference between Net-Givers and
Matchers in sending behavior is statistically significant (MWU test, p = 0.012), and the
difference between Net-Givers and Net-Takers in reception levels is as well (MWU test,
p = 0.053).
We model the number of received (Rr) and sent (Rs) recognition awards as
E(R(r,i)|Xi) = exp (α+ β′(r,1)Ci + β′(r,2)Xi + β3yeari) (2)
E(R(s,i)|Xi) = exp (α+ β′(s,1)Ci + β′(s,2)Xi + β3yeari) (3)
where C is the vector of dummies for Matchers and Net-Givers using Net-Takers as the
base category. The covariate vectorX consists of socio-demographics and company con-
trols, including the career level and job role as defined by the department (e.g. software
development). The variable year absorbs differences between 2017 and 2018.
The respective multivariate Poisson regression estimations presented in Table 3 are in
average contribution.
19In Appendix D, we show in more detail how our cooperative attitudes are related to the cooperation
types proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010). In Appendix E, we pro-
vide an extensive multivariate analysis that characterizes cooperative attitudes in terms of the employees’
personal, behavioral and work-related characteristics. We observe a positive relationship between age and
cooperativeness, and interestingly that female employees are less cooperative than male employees. In
terms of the behavioral survey measures, we document that employees are more likely to be Net-Takers
the more competitive, distrusting, negatively reciprocal, extroverted and neurotic they are. Besides, we
find that employees in the individual performance pay scheme are more likely Net-Takers than Matchers
as compared to employees in the company performance scheme. There are no significant differences in
the distribution of cooperative attitudes with respect to career levels, leadership responsibility, seniority, or
business model.
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Figure 1: Recognition Awards and Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: The graph bar contains data on recognition awards from 2017 for participants in the experiments in
2017 and data from 2018 for participants in 2019. Bars show sample means for each cooperative attitude.
Vertical caps show the 95%-confidence interval that is calculated based on a Poisson distribution.
line with the preceding non-parametric analyses. Net-Givers receive 51% more awards
and send more than twice as many awards as Net-Takers, when including socio demo-
graphics and company controls (see columns (3) and (6)). Due to relatively low number
of employees sending awards (about 11% sent at least one award), these estimates are
less precise then the estimations for the reception patterns. Notably, we also observe that
Matchers receive and sent significantly fewer awards than Net-Givers.
We take the comparatively high number of sent recognition awards by Net-Givers as
evidence for the external validity of experimentally elicited cooperation levels. Sending
an award induces a positive externality on a co-worker and requires writing a justification
for the award, i.e., it represents a costly pro-social act similar to public goods game con-
tributions. The externality may involve positive emotions on the recipient’s side, but also
potentially some indirect monetary value. Remember that managers observe awards;
hence, monetary consequences could include financial awards and merit increases, re-
spectively. Moreover, recognition awards seem to be unrelated to a strong reciprocity
concern as Matchers, who exhibit strong reciprocity through their contribution schedule,
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards
Received Received Received Sent Sent Sent
Net-Taker 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.012 -0.009 -0.060 -0.358 -0.377 -0.445
(0.214) (0.214) (0.224) (0.405) (0.407) (0.388)
Net-Giver 0.403** 0.429** 0.413** 0.807* 0.789* 0.807**
(0.191) (0.194) (0.195) (0.431) (0.433) (0.379)
Constant -1.829*** -1.892*** 24.40** -2.332*** -3.207*** 28.89**
(0.363) (0.504) (10.32) (0.657) (0.878) (13.74)
b[Matchers] p=0.016 p=0.013 p=0.013 p=0.001 p=0.001 p=0.002
- b[Net-Givers]
Socio Demographics X X X X X X
Company Controls X X X** X X X**
Career Dummies X X X*** X X X***
Dep. Dummies X X X*** X X X***
Observations 910 907 842 910 907 842
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.048 0.080 0.056 0.063 0.157
Reg. Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Table 3: Regressions of Recognition Awards on Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; As-
terisks for the control variables show the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero.
Alternative estimations using zero-inflated poisson models yield qualitatively very similar results.
receive and send significantly fewer awards than Net-Givers.
5.3 Financial Rewards and Cooperative Attitudes
Figure 2 shows the mean annual wage increases and the financial award allocation by co-
operative attitudes and pay schemes. A similar pattern arises for both variables:20 When
pooling data from both pay schemes, Net-Takers receive a higher financial appreciation
than their colleagues (MWU tests, wage increases, p < 0.001; financial awards, p = 0.077).
Focusing only on company performance pay, we detect no heterogeneity with respect to
cooperative attitudes (MWU tests, lowest p-value= 0.534). Focusing only on individ-
ual performance pay, Net-Takers receive significantly higher financial rewards than other
employees (MWU tests, pooled, for both outcomes p < 0.001). This also holds when
comparing Net-Takers with Net-Givers (MWU tests, wage increase, p < 0.001; financial
awards, p = 0.009) and Matchers separately (MWU tests, wage increase, p = 0.037; fi-
nancial awards, p < 0.001).
20The Spearman correlation coefficient between wage increases and financial awards is rather weak at
0.081, but still statistically different from zero at the 5% level (p = 0.019).
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Figure 2: Financial Rewards and Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Bars show sample means for each cooperative attitude. Vertical caps show the 95%-confidence in-
terval that is calculated based on a standard normal distribution. (Top) The graph bars contain data from
2016-2018 for participating employees. (Bottom) The graph bars contain data from 2017 for all participating
employees.
We model the financial appreciation variables using linear regressions. Wage increases
( wtwt−1 ) are measured in percent of the base year (either 2016 or 2017 depending on the year
of participation). Financial award payments ( f ) are measured in percent of the wage in
2017. (
wt
wt−1
)
= α+ β′(1Ci + β
′
2Xi + β3yeari + εi (4)(
f
w2017
)
= α+ β′1Ci + β
′
2Xi + εi (5)
In model (4), we use the same covariates as described in model (2).21 In model (5), we
drop year dummies as we include data on financial award payments from 2017 only.
Table 4 shows estimated coefficients from OLS regression models. Columns (2) and (6)
21In Appendix G, we include the change in part-time shares for years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 as a
covariate for wage increases. This allows us to control for employees that moved to parental leave or
partial retirement during the period of our study. The results remain largely robust.
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contain estimated differences between cooperative attitudes, while controlling for socio-
demographic and company covariates. We observe that Net-Givers’ wage increases are
29% (1.5%-points) and financial award payments are 15% (1%-point) lower than Net-
Takers’ appreciation, respectively. As already suggested by Figure 2, this difference is
only relevant in the individual performance pay scheme. Here, Net-Givers receive about
48% (4.4%-points) lower wage increases and 32% (2.7%-points) lower financial award
payments than Net-Takers (see columns (4) and (8), respectively). We observe no differ-
ential financial appreciation between Matchers and Net-Givers and no differences in the
company performance pay scheme.
One can also look at whether cooperative attitudes and observables determine wage
levels instead of wage increases. The results of the analysis are provided in Appendix H.
Controlling for relevant Career and Department Dummies as well as socio-demographic
and company control variables, only age is a significant determinant of overall wage lev-
els. There is no significant interaction effect with the incentive scheme, either. Obviously,
short-term changes in the wage levels are much more responsive to cooperative attitudes.
We know that these variations might change with age, with incentive schemes, and with
other influences. Together with potential long-term selection effects into different areas or
jobs within and outside the company and leveling effects of collective bargaining agree-
ments over time that matter for the overall wage levels, regressions that use wage levels
as dependent variable are probably not that informative for our setup. Hence, the results
based on wage levels should be interpreted carefully; we would have needed a much
more flexible wage determination environment (e.g., top-level management) to detect a
potential relationship between cooperative attitudes and wage levels.
6 Analysis of Potential Mechanisms
How can a company achieve high levels of cooperation despite financial disincentives
to cooperate? According to Rosen (1986), teamwork at the workplace (and cooperation)
involves other, non-financial returns for employees such as less boring work or hedonic
benefits from social interaction. In the context of our study, such non-financial returns
(e.g. measured by the number of received recognition awards) are likely to act as equaliz-
ing or compensating differentials against the financial disincentives that may arise from
cooperation when wage increases or merit-based awards are lower than for those who
cooperate less.
In the following, we consider this mechanism and further plausible mechanisms that
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage Wage Wage Wage Fin. Award Fin. Award Fin. Award Fin. Award
Increase Increase Increase Increase Payment Payment Payment Payment
(in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage)
Net-Takers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.00820 -0.00475 0.00465 0.00533 -0.00666 -0.00702 0.00134 0.000536
(0.00859) (0.00791) (0.00831) (0.00792) (0.00526) (0.00435) (0.00636) (0.00509)
Net-Givers -0.0190** -0.0150** -0.00439 -0.00344 -0.00719 -0.0102** -0.000422 -0.00313
(0.00776) (0.00744) (0.00716) (0.00757) (0.00486) (0.00475) (0.00577) (0.00547)
Ind. Perf. Pay 0.0228** 0.00896 0.00896 0.00289 -0.00922 -0.00315
(0.00980) (0.00831) (0.0105) (0.00662) (0.00749) (0.00823)
Net-Takers × 0.0454** 0.0442** 0.0268** 0.0269***
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0105) (0.0103)
Matchers × 0.00620 0.00561 -0.00754 -0.00347
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.00955) (0.00928)
Net-Givers × 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ind. Perf. Pay (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Constant 0.0536*** 0.0520** 0.0287** 0.0421 0.0576*** 0.0261 0.0541*** 0.0204
(0.0107) (0.0253) (0.0134) (0.0261) (0.00731) (0.0192) (0.00808) (0.0193)
b[Matchers] p=0.134 p=0.139 p=0.291 p=0.296 p=0.898 p=0.346 p=0.713 p=0.424
-b[Net-Givers]
b[Matchers | IPP] . . p=0.085 p=0.079 . . p=0.002 p=0.005
-b[Net-Givers | IPP]
Socio Demographics X X X X X X*** X X***
Company Controls X X X X X X X X
Career Dummies X X X X X X*** X X***
Dep. Dummies X X X X X X*** X X**
Observations 846 831 836 831 863 857 863 857
R2 0.007 0.046 0.025 0.054 0.006 0.236 0.018 0.244
Reg. Model Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Table 4: Regressions of Financial Appreciation on Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For wage increases, we use data from 2016/2017
for participants in 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants in 2019. We use the value of financial award payments received in 2017 in percent
of the 2017-wage level. Asterisks for the control variables show the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero.
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may be prima facie in line with our main results. In discussing alternative mechanisms,
we do not necessarily assume that our three main results, (i) high cooperation levels, (ii)
a negative nexus between cooperative attitudes and financial rewards, and (iii) a positive
nexus between cooperative attitudes and non-financial outcomes, are connected. Obvi-
ously, only exogenous variation in some variables can provide a final answer on the sole
driver of our results. However, some variables will never be varied exogenously in a
meaningful way such as wage levels or wage increases. There is always a tradeoff be-
tween searching under the lamppost (and accepting that one studies very special setups
that allow for exogenous variation) or using real-world environments that limit opportu-
nities to exogenous variation. Nonetheless, we can provide heterogeneity analyses and
robustness checks to shed light on the potential relevance of various mechanisms for our
setting and for being in line with our main results.
6.1 High Levels of Cooperation
Our measures of cooperation are qualitatively comparable to the standard conditional
contribution patterns documented in the behavioral economics literature; yet they ap-
pear higher (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010; Kocher et al.,
2015).22 To what extent cooperation rates in our setting reflect a general high level of co-
operativeness of employees or rather a stronger role of a potential social desirability bias
in our setup is a question that deserves further attention.
Within the framework of our study, we implemented an unexpected option to donate
the experimental income at the end of the experiment in 2017. Participants could choose
between receiving their income from the experiments in their personal bank account and
donating it to one of five charities of their choice. At this point, participants did not know
their income yet. We find a positive but insignificant relationship between donations and
our public goods game variables (contributions and more cooperative types). This holds
regardless of whether we use unconditional, conditional contributions or cooperative at-
titudes as regressors (see Table 5). Thus, donations seem to draw on a distinct concept
22With respect to other non-student samples, Charness and Villeval (2009) observes that employees in
the manufacturing industry contributed between 32% and 38% of their endowment to a three-person public
good. Another example is Burks et al. (2016), who classify 24% of truck drivers in the same company as
free-riders using a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Algan et al. (2013, 2014) conducted public goods games with
programmers at Sourceforge.net (an open source software platform) and users that contribute to Wikipedia,
respectively. In both samples, subjects have already selected in a voluntary contribution platform; still, they
are less cooperative, on average, than employees in our company (the 850 Sourceforge.net users uncondi-
tionally contribute 64% of their 10 tokens; the 1,194 Wikipedia users are less likely unconditional contribu-
tors and more likely free-riders than employees in our setting).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation Donation Donation Donation
Uncond. Contribution 0.0235
(0.0205)
Belief About Others’ -0.00976
Uncond. Contribution (0.0213)
Mean Cond. Contribution 0.0290
(0.0275)
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 0.156
(0.160)
Net-Giver 0.259
(0.161)
Constant -0.283 -0.0318 -0.250 -0.259**
(0.173) (0.155) (0.157) (0.128)
N 438 438 438 438
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.0003 0.002 0.004
Reg. Model Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 5: Regressions of Donations on Public Goods Game Measures
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions are based on employees participating in the
experiments in 2017; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
than cooperative attitudes and cooperation. We consider this suggestive evidence that
social desirability is not too much of an issue in our setup. Donation behavior (or dic-
tator game giving more generally) is often thought of as being heavily affected by social
desirability concerns. If cooperation in the public goods game was affected by social de-
sirability concerns as well, we would observe a significantly positive correlation between
the two sets of decisions.
In 2019, we implemented an additional public goods game after the main experiment
in which the MPCR was set to either 0.3 or 1.2. Participants that are driven by social de-
sirability concerns should be less likely to adjust their unconditional contribution to the
reduction in the MPCR from 0.5 to 0.3, because they might want to signal cooperativeness.
Responses to the increase of the MPCR to 1.2 should reflect mainly a sound understand-
ing of the game’s incentives. We elicited unconditional contributions, beliefs, and condi-
tional contribution schedules for both alternative MPCRs, using the strategy method. We
observe strong reactions to the two variations. Subjects significantly decrease uncondi-
tional contributions, beliefs, and conditional contributions when the MPCR decreases to
0.3 (means: 3.71, 2.91, 3.82, respectively, using Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests in compar-
ison to the standard MPCR of 0.5; all p-values< 0.001). The reverse happens when the
MPCR increases to 1.2 (8.82, 8.53, 8.37, respectively, using Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests
in comparison to the standard MPCR of 0.5 all p-values< 0.001). We conclude that nei-
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ther social desirability nor confusion are convincing explanations for the high levels of
cooperation that we observe.
6.2 Negative Nexus Between Cooperative Attitudes and Financial Re-
wards
Following Bowles et al. (2001) and Barr and Serneels (2009), the correlation between coop-
erative attitudes and financial rewards could also be explained by an omitted variable bias
with respect to skills that are specific to cooperative attitudes and related to performance
differences. For example, Net-Givers could have a comparative advantage in networking
or socializing and Net-Takers could be more strategically sophisticated. Table 6 shows
OLS regressions of financial rewards on cooperative attitudes estimated for the two busi-
ness models that exist in the company. As cooperation is more important in cloud-related
jobs, we expect Net-Givers to perform better than Net-Takers in such jobs and thus receive
higher wage increases or financial awards. However, Net-Takers receive significantly
higher financial rewards than Net-Givers and Matchers (see columns (1) and (2) and col-
umn (5) and (6), respectively). This relationship does not exist in customer-related jobs
(see columns (3) and (4) and columns (7) and (8), respectively). Thus, even if Net-Givers
work on tasks with complementarities for which they should have the more appropri-
ate cooperative attitude, Net-Takers get 2.1%-points higher annual wage increases and
2.5%-points higher award payments. The result indicates that there are no strong com-
parative skill and performance differences between attitudes; however, it might still be
the case that Net-Takers have an absolute skill advantage. However, this would require
Net-Takers, i.e. less pro-social types, to have, in general, higher levels of skill.
Another potential mechanism could be related to selection based on cooperative atti-
tudes. Net-Takers could select into jobs with higher financial rewards, while Net-Givers
could select into jobs with higher non-financial rewards (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Dohmen
and Falk, 2011). Conversely, along the lines of Bowles (1998) and Levitt and List (2007),
financial and non-financial rewards could also shape cooperative attitudes. Pay scheme
specific norms could render selfish behavior in the individual performance scheme and
pro-social behavior in the company performance scheme more appropriate and hence
employees that comply with the norm get financially rewarded.
In line with both explanations, Appendix E shows that employees in the individual
performance pay scheme are significantly more likely to be Net-Takers than employees in
the company performance pay, which goes with conventional wisdom. Individual per-
formance incentives do not foster pro-self behavior or they do not seem to attract more
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage Wage Wage Wage Fin. Award Fin. Award Fin. Award Fin. Award
Increase Increase Increase Increase Payment Payment Payment Payment
(in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage) (in % of Wage)
Net-Takers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.0326** -0.0230** -0.00272 -0.00141 -0.00515 -0.0136** 0.00188 -0.00475
(0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0138) (0.0156) (0.00764) (0.00643) (0.00899) (0.00844)
Net-Givers -0.0337** -0.0213* -0.00532 -0.00782 -0.0130* -0.0245*** 0.00164 -0.00453
(0.0148) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.00719) (0.00701) (0.00876) (0.00920)
Constant 0.0672*** 0.0934** 0.0303* 0.0505* 0.0655*** 0.0680* 0.0340*** -0.0487*
(0.0145) (0.0457) (0.0173) (0.0278) (0.0115) (0.0357) (0.0123) (0.0263)
b[Matchers] p=0.895 p=0.852 p=0.827 p=0.612 p=0.186 p=0.044 p=0.975 p=0.943
-b[Net-Givers]
Included Cloud Cloud Customer Customer Cloud Cloud Customer Customer
Socio Demographics X X X X** X X* X X*
Company Controls X X X X X X X X***
Career Dummies X X X X X X*** X X***
Dep. Dummies X X X X X X*** X X***
Observations 410 406 236 233 422 417 248 245
R2 0.022 0.109 0.005 0.129 0.008 0.294 0.042 0.294
Reg. Model Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Table 6: Regressions of Financial Appreciation on Cooperative Attitudes by Business Model
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For wage increases, we use data from 2016/2017
for participants of 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants in 2019. We use the value of financial award payments received in 2017 in percent
of the wage level in that year in 2017. We exclude employees that neither work in the cloud nor in the customer business model. Here, we do
not observe statistically relevant differences in financial awards with respect to cooperative attitudes. In terms of wage increases, we observe that
Matchers receive slightly higher increases than Net-Takers which is marginally significant (p=0.071). Asterisks for the control variables show the
test result from a F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero.
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pro-social employees. Also, our survey analysis confirms that employees in the indi-
vidual performance pay consider cooperation to be less important to fulfill their tasks
successfully. If this observation is due to the idea that incentives shape preferences, we
would expect that employees who already work for several years in the company and
presumably in the same pay scheme exhibit pay scheme specific norms more strongly.
Thus, we expect that employees get less cooperative the longer they work in the indi-
vidual performance pay scheme. Table 7 shows results from an OLS regression assessing
the effect of seniority on the relationship between cooperative attitudes and pay schemes.
While the significant difference in mean conditional contributions between pay schemes
remains, we find no significant interaction effect with seniority. This evidence suggests
that there is a potentially stronger role for selection.
Mean Cond.
Contribution
Ind. Perf. Pay -0.906**
(0.407)
Seniority 0.012
(0.0172)
Ind. Perf. Pay * -0.003
Seniority (0.0280)
Age 0.006
(0.0131)
Stability 0.037
(0.127)
Constant 4.704***
(0.804)
Socio-Demographics X
Company Controls X
Career Dummies X
Dept. Dummies X
Observations 857
R2 0.036
Reg. Model Linear
Table 7: Regressions of Cond. Contributions on Pay Schemes and Seniority
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks for the control
variables would show the test result from a F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero. For none of the
variables the joint difference from zero can be rejected at conventional significance values. The variable
stability capture the employee’s feeling of team stability that incorporate a survey item on how long the
employee works in his/her job function and hence pay scheme.
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6.3 Positive Nexus Between Cooperative Attitudes and Non-Financial
Rewards
We observe that the positive relationship between cooperative attitudes and sending
awards appears widely insusceptible to context factors like pay schemes and business
models. Based on simple regression similar to those used in Table 3, we observe that
Net-Givers send significantly more recognition awards than their colleagues in the cloud
(means per employee: 0.32 versus 0.12, p = 0.085) and the customer business model
(means per employee: 0.65 versus 0.13, p = 0.002) as well as in the company performance
pay scheme (0.41 per employee versus 0.13 per employee, p = 0.004). We also observe a
similar pattern in the individual performance pay scheme that is however not statistically
significant; admittedly, there is a relatively small sample size for this comparison (0.27 per
employee versus 0.19 per employee, p = 0.492). The existence of the relationship across
different company contexts suggests a more general link between recognition awards and
cooperative attitudes, corroborating our external validity argument.
At the same time, we observe strong differences in reception rates between context
factors. We find that reception rates are generally higher in the cloud model than in the
customer-based model (0.31 per employee versus 0.21 per employee; p = 0.046) and in
the company performance pay versus the individual performance pay (0.30 per employee
versus 0.16 per employee; p = 0.023). This indicates that the recognition tool is used more
frequently in areas in which teamwork and cooperation is required.
In our post-experimental survey, we elicit further variables that may relate to non-
financial rewards or non-financial costs of cooperation. On the individual level, we cap-
ture work-related stress and overall work satisfaction. While our stress measure appears
to be unrelated to conditional contributions (Spearman Correlation= -0.098, p = 0.438),
we observe a strong positive correlation between cooperativeness of employees and work
satisfaction (Spearman Correlation= 0.916, p = 0.014) that is robust to including personal
and company controls. On the team-level, we measure perceived team cohesion and
team stability. In Appendix I, we show that there exists no statistically relevant relation-
ship between team stability and the share of Net-Givers in a team, but teams that perceive
themselves as being more cohesive tend to consist of more Net-Givers.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides novel evidence on how cooperative attitudes of employees are re-
lated to professional behavior and rewards within a large company. We observe high
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levels of cooperation among employees and evidence on the external validity of our ex-
perimental measure of cooperative attitudes for the company setting. In addition, we
document a robust negative nexus between cooperative attitudes and financial apprecia-
tion, and a positive nexus between cooperative attitudes and non-financial rewards.
In line with a recent literature that emphasizes the intrinsic nature of cooperation (e.g.,
Hamilton et al., 2003; Bandiera et al., 2005, 2011, 2013; Ruff and Fehr, 2014) our analyses
suggest that the company studied here positively affects levels of cooperation – despite
financial disincentives for cooperators – through providing cooperative employees with
non-financial compensations. We also document a potential role of selection based on
cooperative attitudes in pay schemes similar to Burks et al. (2009).
Our findings have implications for the optimal design of incentives and management
practices in companies that want to foster cooperation. A general implication is that com-
panies should create a work context that allows non-monetary forms of rewards as values
for cooperation to unfold. This might entail the opportunity for employees to voluntarily
select into differently composed teams or work organizations, or the selection into organi-
zational units with different cooperative cultures (Kosfeld and Von Siemens, 2011). At the
same time, our findings stress the importance of management practices that operational-
ize the non-monetary returns of cooperation (like the recognition award systems used in
our company).
We see our study as a first step and encourage other researchers to study cooperation
in corporations as well. Obviously, we have no way to take firm conclusions regarding
company-specific and more general results, given that our focus is on one company. It
might well be that the specific interplay between incentives and culture at our company
is different than in other companies. It might well be that the industry that our com-
pany is operating in has specific characteristics in terms of how cooperation is rewarded.
Given the importance of cooperation in teamwork, it is astonishing that there is not more
research empirically addressing the relationship between corporate culture, financial and
non-financial rewards, and cooperation within the company. Although we believe that
the gist of our results will hold more generally, given its systematic pattern, our results
at the very least provide a proof of concept: The experimentally elicited measures on co-
operation are systematically related to outcomes in the company. Our tests for external
validity provide promising results.
We have searched for evidence outside the light of a lamppost, in contrast to some
other studies that use more artificial designs in the wild to get more powerful inference.
Both approaches seem useful. Next to understanding the causal mechanisms underlying
our findings, a deeper understanding of the nature of the relationship between financial
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and non-financial incentives for cooperative behavior in organizations is required. Can
financial and non-financial incentives work as substitutes on the individual employee
level and, at the same time, work as complements when regarding the company’s prof-
its? How can the optimal mix of financial and non-financial incentives be character-
ized? More research is needed to empirically understand the optimal balance between
cooperation-enhancing and competition-enhancing policies within organizations, proba-
bly dependent on cooperation culture and workforce composition.
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Appendix
A Variable Overview
Variable Scale Description Details
team membership nominal Unique team identifier (from ORG structure)
team size ratio Number of team members
age ratio Age of employee
gender nominal Gender of employee
seniority ratio Seniority of employee (in years)
job function nominal Twelve functional areas (departements) which consists of clus-
ters of several job families based on generic job content
Communications, Develop-
ment, Education and Training,
Finance, Administration, Hu-
man Resources, Information
Technology, Marketing, Sales,
Consulting, Not assigned
career ordinal Nine career level of employee (describes contribution based
upon business results, accountability, complexity, experience and
communication)
Not specified for reasons of dis-
cretion
leader binary Leadership responsibility Yes/No
pay scheme nominal Employees pay scheme Either company performance
pay or individual performance
pay
wage ratio Yearly wage before taxes
financial awards ratio Amount of money received in a year
received recognition ratio Number of peer-to-peer awards received for being cooperative
(received)
sent recognition ratio Number of peer-to-peer awards received for being cooperative
(sent)
Table A.1: Variables Collected from Company Records
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Variable Scale Description Details
contribute ratio Unconditional contribution
x-contribute ratio Contribution conditional on x contributed by other team mem-
bers
belief contribute ratio Belief about average contribution of the other team members
with mpcr variation ratio Only in 2019: contribute and belief contribute for mpcr= 0.3 and
mpcr= 1.2
Strategy method, within subject
donation nominal Only in 2017: earnings from experiments transferred to individ-
ual account or to a charity
Personal bank account,
Deutsche Aidshilfe, rzte ohne
Grenzen, World Wide Fund For
Nature (WWF), SOS Kinderdorf,
Amnesty International
Table A.2: Variables Collected from the Experiments
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Variable Scale Description Details
team cooperation ordinal Need for cooperation among team members
team cohesion cardinal Perception of team cohesion
team stability cardinal Perception of staff stability within the team
neg. competiveness ordinal Perception of negative competitive pressure among team mem-
bers
pos. competiveness ordinal Perception of positive competitive pressure among team mem-
bers
stress cardinal Perceived chronic stress Individual average score
big five cardinal big five personality measure Individual average score (for
each personality trait)
neg. reciprocity ordinal Social preference measure indicating the participants tendency
for negative reciprocity
pos. reciprocity ordinal Social preference measure indicating the participants tendency
for positive reciprocity
trust ordinal Social preference measure indicating the participants trust
competitive attitude cardinal The participants individual competitive attitude Individual average score
children binary Indicating whether the participant has children or not
friends ratio The participants number of friends
complement nominal In which business model is the employee working? Cloud model
requires much more cooperation than customer model
Cloud, Customer, Neither
Table A.3: Variables Collected from the Survey
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B Instructions
You are a member of a group of three, consisting of anonymous participants in this study.
All participants are randomly selected employees of [COMPANY]. The combination into
groups of 3 occurs randomly. The payouts for you and the other group members in this
section depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other members of your group.
Decision-making situation
Each member of the group must decide on the use of 10 tokens each. You and the other
group members can put the 10 tokens into a private account, or you can deposit them in
whole or in part into a common account. Any tokens that you do not deposit into the
common account are automatically added to your private account.
Income from the private account
You earn exactly one euro for each token you put in your private account. For example,
if you put 4 tokens into your private account, you will earn exactly e4 from your private
account. No one but you receives income from your private account.
Income from the common account
For each token that is added to the common account, you will receive e0.5. The other two
group members also each receive e0.5 for each token you contribute. Conversely, you
also earn money from the contributions of the other two group members to the common
account. The income of each member from the common account is determined as follows:
Individual income from the common account = Sum of the contributions of all three group
members to the common account times 0.5
For example, if the sum of all three group members’ contributions to the common ac-
count results in 30 tokens, then you and the other two group members each receive 30 x
0.5 = e15 from the common account. If the three group members pay a total of 10 tokens
into the common account, you and the other two group members receive 10 x 0.5 = e5
each from the common account.
Total income Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account
and your income from the common account. So:
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Income from the private account (= 10 - contribution to the common account) + income from the
common account (=0.5 x sum of contributions to the common account) = Total income
As described above, you can use 10 tokens to fund your private account and the com-
mon account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which
we will refer to below as the contribution and the contribution table. You can find a de-
tailed description of your entries on the entry screens.
B.1 Comprehension Questions
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you have understood the instruc-
tions of the experiment. If you are unsure, you can return to the instructions by clicking
on “Back”.
1. Assume that none of the group members (even you yourself) pay a contribution into
the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
2. Assume that all three group members (also you yourself) each pay a contribution of
10 tokens into the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
3. Assume that you deposit 0 tokens into the common account and that the other two
members of your group deposit 10 tokens each.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
4. Assume that you pay 10 tokens into the common account and the other two mem-
bers of your group each pay 0 tokens.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
40
B.2 Contribution Decisions
When choosing the contribution to the common account, you determine how many of
the 10 tokens you want to deposit into the common account. The deposit to your private
account is automatically the difference between 10 tokens and your contribution to the
common account.
• Please enter the amount you would like to pay into the common account (any
whole-number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible): ...
Now you will be asked to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table, you
should specify how many tokens you want to pay into the common account for each
possible (rounded) average contribution of the other two group members to the common
account. So, depending on how much the others contribute on average, you must define
your own contribution decision. For each average contribution of the other two group
members, please indicate the amount you would like to pay into the common account
(any whole-number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible; of course, you can
also enter the same amount several times):
What is your contribution to the common account if...
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 0 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 1 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 2 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 3 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 4 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 5 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 6 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 7 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 8 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 9 tokens.
• ... the other two group members deposit an average of 10 tokens.
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Help option: The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average con-
tributions of the other two group members to the common account. You now have to
specify how many tokens you want to deposit into the common account for each slider,
provided that the others contribute the specified amount on average. You have to make
an entry in each field. For example, you are to specify how much you contribute to the
common account if the other group members deposit an average of 0 tokens into the com-
mon account; how many tokens you contribute if the others contribute an average of 1
token or 2 tokens or 3 tokens, and so on. You can enter any whole-number contribution
from 0 tokens to 10 tokens in each field and, of course, the same amount several times.
B.3 Incentive Compatibility
Payout relevance of your decisions
After all study participants have made their decisions, one member is randomly selected
in each group of 3. For the randomly selected member, only the contribution table filled
in by him/her is relevant for decision making and payout. For the other two group mem-
bers who have not been selected, only the contribution is relevant for decision-making
and payout. The average of the two contributions (rounded to the next whole number)
then determines the relevant conditional contribution from the third member’s contribu-
tion table. Of course, you do not yet know which of your contribution decisions will be
randomly selected. You must therefore carefully consider both types of contribution de-
cisions, as both can become relevant to you.
The following graphic (Figure 1) is intended to visualize the decision-making situa-
tion. For the randomly selected person on the right, the conditional contribution from
the contribution table is relevant. For the other two group members, the contribution is
relevant for payout.
B.4 Belief Elicitation
In addition to your earnings from your private and common account, you will receive a
further payout for estimating the average contribution of the other two members of your
group to your common account. Your payout will depend on how accurately you esti-
mate the actual average contribution of your two group members. If you are exactly right,
you will receive an additional e5. If your estimate differs by 0.5 or more tokens from the
actual average contribution, you will receive e0. Please enter a number from 0 to 10 (each
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Figure 1: Incentive Compatibility
number is allowed in steps of 0.5).
What do you think is the average amount of tokens your two group members con-
tribute to the common account?
• ... Average contribution of the other two members of your group
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C Communication and Coordination of Employees
Employees could interrupt the experiments and continue at a later point in time. On
average, employees finished the experiment and survey within approximately one and
a half days (mean=1.35 days). While employees in a public goods game group were
anonymously selected and matched, one might be concerned about communication and
coordination during the experiment as some teams in the company are seated in shared
offices (max four team members per office). To alleviate this concern, we observe no cor-
relation between contribution behavior, beliefs and attitudes of employees with respect to
the variance of finishing times within work teams (Spearman Correlations; uncond. con-
tribution, ρ = −0.004, p = 0.905; belief about others’ uncond. contribution, ρ = −0.006,
p = 0.853; mean cond. contribution, ρ = 0.008, p = 0.827).
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D Overview of Public Goods Game Measures
Our employee sample appears to be very cooperative as can be seen from Table 2. In
the unconditional contribution decision, they contribute on average 7.9 Tokens (which
corresponds to 79% of the endowment) in the public good. The average belief about the
public good contribution of the other group members equals 6.7 Tokens. The difference in
actual contributions and beliefs is statistically significant at the 1%-level (Wilcoxon Sign
Rank Test, p < 0.001). Reassuringly, we observe very similar responses in the public
goods games when comparing the variables collected from the experiments in 2017 and
2019. This holds for the data presented in Table 4 – see column “Comparison”.
All Experiment 2017 Experiment 2019 Comparison
Count Mean SD Count Mean SD Count Mean SD P-Value
Unconditional
Contributions
910 7.89 2.93 438 7.90 2.97 472 7.88 2.90 0.890
Belief about
Others’
Contributions
910 6.70 2.78 438 6.73 2.82 472 6.67 2.75 0.751
Mean Condi-
tional Contri-
bution
910 5.30 2.25 438 5.26 2.19 472 5.33 2.29 0.607
Slope Param-
eter
910 0.71 0.43 438 0.71 0.43 472 0.70 0.43 0.818
Table 4: Overview of Public Goods Game Variables by Wave
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests.
We observe that cooperative attitudes are highly predictive for unconditional contri-
butions, also when we control for beliefs about other’s contributions (see Table 5). Net-
Givers contribute more than Matchers and Matchers contribute more than Net-Takers.
Both differences are highly statistically significant.
The scatter plot in Figure 2 shows a significant variation in the average conditional
contributions and the reciprocity parameter of employees. The size of the bubbles rep-
resents the frequency of the observed combination of mean conditional contribution and
reciprocity. There are several mass points that stand out.
Next to our cooperative attitudes, we also classify cooperation types as described by
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010). These types are also visible
in the scatter plot. First, we observe employees that behave like perfect conditional co-
operators ([1, 5]). Secondly, there are clusters of employees whose contributions are inde-
pendent of the contribution schedule. They are either contributing nothing (free-riders) or
they contribute a strictly positive amount (unconditional cooperators). Most of the uncon-
45
Uncond. Contribution
Belief About Others’ 0.642***
Undcond. Contribution (0.0269)
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 1.196***
(0.196)
Net-Giver 1.536***
(0.198)
Dummy (2019) 0.00693
(0.137)
Constant 2.520***
(0.282)
Observations 910
R2 0.509
Reg. Model Linear
Table 5: Determinants of Unconditional Contributions
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2: Relationship Between Mean Cond. Contributions and Slope Parameter
Notes: The graph contains data from all participating employees. Bubble sizes show the frequency of the
combination of both variables. Reciprocity is the slope parameter from an OLS regression between an
employees’ conditional contributions and the contribution schedule.
ditional cooperators contribute all their endowment. Thirdly, imperfectly conditional co-
operators are split in two groups, conditional cooperators with a self-serving bias (mean
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unconditional contribution below 5) and conditional cooperators with an other-serving
bias (mean unconditional contributions above 5). The remaining employees are classified
as Others.
Figure 3: Distribution of Cooperation Types
Notes: Bars show the fraction of all participating employees that belong to a particular cooperation type.
Bars are ordered by mean conditional contributions.
Figure 3 shows an overview of all types and Figure 4 relates our cooperative attitudes
and the cooperation types. Cooperative attitudes subsume the classification types rea-
sonably well. We use cooperative attitudes because they prove handier for the statistical
analysis.
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Figure 4: Cooperation Types and Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Bars show the fraction of participating employees that belong to a particular cooperative attitude.
Table 6 shows an inverse U-shape relationship between cooperative attitudes and reci-
procity.
Slope Parameter
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 0.497***
(0.0328)
Net-Giver 0.134***
(0.0331)
Constant 0.456***
(0.0263)
N 910
R2 0.238
Reg. Model Linear
Table 6: Reciprocity and Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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E Correlates of Cooperative Attitudes
In Table 7, we present correlations of cooperative attitudes with socio-demographic char-
acteristics and behavioral measures. We account for the categorical scale of the dependent
variable by using a Multinomial Logit Regression Model.
Cooperative Attitude
Matcher Net-Giver Net-Taker
Age 0.00196 0.0252** Base Category
(0.0108) (0.0110)
Female -0.166 -0.418**
(0.192) (0.200)
High Education 0.102 -0.0451
(0.201) (0.205)
Patience 0.0191 0.0226*
(0.0131) (0.0136)
Competitiveness -0.286*** -0.391***
(0.103) (0.106)
Distrust -0.175* -0.278***
(0.103) (0.108)
Positive Reciprocity 0.368** 0.442***
(0.153) (0.161)
Negative Reciprocity 0.290*** 0.0965
(0.103) (0.109)
Dummy (2019) -0.00368 -0.198
(0.198) (0.201)
Constant -1.431 -1.716
(1.066) (1.115)
Observations 905
Pseudo R2 0.032
Reg. Model MnLogit
Table 7: Cooperative Attitudes, Socio-Demographics and Behavioral Measures
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Five subjects missing because
they did not insert information on their socio-demographic status. High Education is an indicator for higher
than median education subsuming two out of five education categories.
First, we observe an indication for age being positively related to the cooperativeness
of employees. Older employees are significantly more likely to be Net-Givers rather than
Net-Takers. The share of Matchers is relatively stable across age cohorts. Second, female
employees are less frequently Net-Givers than Net-Takers and, again, the share of Match-
ers is very similar. Marginal effect calculations show that female employees are about
7%-points more likely to be Net-Takers rather than Net-Givers than male employees are.
Third, the competitiveness index correlates with cooperative attitudes. Intuitively, em-
ployees are more likely to be Net-Takers the more competitive they are. Moreover, we
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find that the agreement to the statement “You can’t trust strangers anymore” is highly
predictive for the cooperative attitude. The likelihood of being a Net-Taker decreases
with reported distrust in strangers. Finally, we observe positive correlations between sur-
vey measures for positive and negative reciprocity (agreement with “When someone does
me a favor, I am willing to return it” and “If I am treated unjustly, I will take revenge at
the first occasion, even if there is a cost to do so”, respectively) and cooperative attitudes
– again, in the expected positive direction.23
In Table 8, we present the correlations between cooperative attitudes and structural
variables from the company context. Here, the main observation is that the cooperative-
ness of employees is less pronounced in the individual performance pay scheme. While
we classify 20% of participants in the company performance pay scheme as Net-Taker,
the respective share increases to 27% in the individual performance pay. This increase in
the share of Net-Takers comes along with a decrease in the share of Matchers (from 41%
to 35%). The share of Net-Givers is not significantly different between incentive schemes.
We do not observe significant differences in the distribution of cooperative attitudes with
respect to career levels, leadership responsibility, seniority, or the team work production
function.
Lastly, we use a short form of the big five personality trait questionnaire validated by
Rammstedt et al. (2013) from our online survey. The traits consist of extraversion, agree-
ableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Table 9 shows the correlation
between our cooperative attitude classification and the five traits. Net-Takers are sig-
nificantly more extroverted and neurotic than Net-Givers, and more conscientious than
Matchers.
23Other studies report that female subjects (both employees and students) are more cooperative (e.g.,
Charness and Villeval, 2009). Low cooperativeness of women compared to men in our context could be
related to the selection of women working in a male-dominated work environment.
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Cooperative Attitude
Matchers Net-Givers Net-Takers
Female -0.210 -0.415** Base Category
(0.200) (0.206)
High Education 0.127 0.0114
(0.209) (0.210)
Seniority 0.00382 0.0182
(0.0160) (0.0161)
Low Career Level 0.152 -0.105
(0.433) (0.459)
Medium Career Level 0.0924 0.403
(0.333) (0.343)
High Career Level 0 0
(.) (.)
Leader -0.133 -0.0317
(0.322) (0.319)
Ind. Performance Pay -0.511** -0.370
(0.232) (0.231)
Cloud 0 0
(.) (.)
Customer -0.163 -0.139
(0.218) (0.222)
Neither -0.387* -0.0336
(0.234) (0.231)
Dummy (2019) -0.0606 -0.303
(0.218) (0.217)
Constant 0.792 0.714
(0.539) (0.548)
Observations 861
Pseudo R2 0.014
Reg. Model MnLogit
Table 8: Cooperative Attitudes, Socio-Demographics and Company Variables
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 49 subjects are missing be-cause
they did not insert information of their socio-demographic status or there was no wage data available. High
Education is an indicator for higher than median education subsuming two out of five education categories.
Career levels subsume several categories in each presented category.
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Cooperative Attitudes
Matchers Net-Givers Net-Takers
Age 0.00814 0.0316*** Base Category
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Female -0.0421 -0.291
(0.192) (0.200)
High Education 0.0749 -0.145
(0.201) (0.204)
Extraversion -0.136 -0.203**
(0.0927) (0.0949)
Agreeableness 0.0346 0.0957
(0.122) (0.125)
Conscientiousness -0.272** -0.129
(0.138) (0.143)
Neuroticism -0.134 -0.292***
(0.103) (0.107)
Openness 0.0323 0.149
(0.0984) (0.101)
Dummy (2019) -0.0274 -0.258
(0.195) (0.197)
Constant 1.972** 0.803
(0.984) (1.021)
Observations 906
Pseudo R2 0.018
Reg. Model MnLogit
Table 9: Cooperative Attitudes, Socio-Demographics and Personality Traits
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Four subjects missing because
they did not insert information on their socio-demographic status. High Education is an indicator for higher
than median education subsuming two out of five education categories.
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F Description of Outcome Variables
In the following, we provide descriptive analyses of our main outcome variables. Com-
pany variables stem from the records as of 12/31/2017 for employees that were invited to
participate in the experiments in 2017. For employees invited to the second experiment,
we use record data as of 12/31/2018.
Table 10 shows the data availability for our main outcome variables. We have data
on recognition awards from 2017 for employees that participated in 2017 and the data
from 2018 for the participants from 2019. Wage data covers 2016/2017 and 2017/2018
for the employees in the different roll-out phases, respectively. This allows us to look at
changes in wage over time. We do not have information on financial awards in 2018 for
employees from the first experiments due to data restrictions at the company. In addition,
the company-wide budget for the financial award allocation differed strongly between
2017 and 2018 such that there is low comparability.
Wage Financial Awards Recognition Awards
2016 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018
Participants from
Experiments 2017 X X X X X X X
Participants from
Experiments 2019 X X X X X X X
Table 10: Overview of Record Data Used as Outcome Variables
Notes: Table shows the data availability of our main outcome variables for employees that could participate
in 2017 and 2019, respectively. The variables are retrieved from the company records at the 12/31/2017 or
the 12/31/2018, respectively.
Wages. Between 2016 and 2018, participating employees received an average yearly
wage increase (in percent of the previous year) of 4.5% with a standard deviation of 8.61%
within the range of -63.4% and 72.5%. Calculated as a full-time position equivalent, we
observe an average increase of 4.2% with a standard deviation of 3.58% within the range
of -8.5% and 33.9%. A full-time wage equivalent equals the nominal wage dived by the
part-time share. For example, if an employee receives a wage of e50,000 but works part-
time on a 50% position, the full-time equivalent is 50,000/50% = e100,000. Here, we
assume a linear relation between the part-time parameter and the wage level which might
not be true. In our analyses, we rely on the nominal compensation changes and levels
(including potential variations in the part-time parameter).
Financial awards. We measure the award value in percent of the wage in 2017. In this
year, conferred awards were worth up to 30% of the yearly wage. The average award
payment was about 6% (standard deviation of 5.5%). About 60.4% of employees received
53
an award payment larger than 0.
Recognition awards. In total, we observe 354 recognition awards received by 225 (38.90%)
employees and 274 awards sent by 102 (11.21%) employees in 2017 and 2018.24 Condi-
tional on sending at least one award, we observe that employees sent up to 20 awards
with the median number being 2 and a mean of 2.69. Conditional on receiving at least
one award, employees received up to 7 awards with the median number being 1 and an
average of 1.57.
24The number of received awards and the number of sent awards do not need to equalize because we
only have a subsample of employees and awards can, of course, be sent to non-participating employees.
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G Part-Time Variations and Financial Rewards
Table 11 shows robustness analyses of our main effects with regard to the part-time share
of employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Wage Fin. Award FTE-Wage
Increase Payment Increase
(in %) (in %of Wage) (in %)
Net-Takers 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Matchers 0.00568 0.000596 0.00128
(0.00403) (0.00506) (0.00319)
Net-Givers 0.00413 -0.00312 0.00218
(0.00289) (0.00547) (0.00275)
Ind. Perf. Pay 0.000506 -0.00326 -0.0000508
(0.00599) (0.00819) (0.00580)
Net-Takers × 0.0208*** 0.0270*** 0.0148**
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.00773) (0.0103) (0.00734)
Matchers × 0.00898 -0.00361 0.0128
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.00855) (0.00928) (0.00818)
Net-Givers × 0 0 0
Ind. Perf. Pay (.) (.) (.)
∆(Part-time Share) 0.0127***
(0.000541)
Part-time Share 0.0000577
(0.000215)
Constant 0.0909*** 0.0145 0.0979***
(0.0126) (0.0273) (0.0123)
b[Matchers] p=0.655 p=0.412 p=0.737
-b[Net-Givers]
b[Matchers | IPP] p=0.218 p=0.002 p=0.816
-b[Net-Takers | IPP]
Socio Demographics X*** X*** X***
Company Controls X X X
Career Dummies X*** X*** X***
Dep. Dummies X*** X** X***
Observations 831 857 831
R2 0.817 0.244 0.198
Reg. Model Linear Linear Linear
Table 11: Regressions of Financial Appreciation Controlling for Part-Time Effects
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For wage
increases, we use data from 2016/2017 for participants in 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants
in 2019. We use the value of financial award payments received in 2017 in percent of the 2017-wage level.
FTE-Wage Increase is the full-time equivalent of wage increases. Asterisks for the control variables show the
test result from an F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero.
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H Wage Levels and Cooperative Attitudes
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 12 show that we find no significant relationship between wage
levels and cooperative attitudes. In columns (4) to (6), we additionally control for an
interaction of cooperative attitudes and age. It can be seen that in these regressions, Net-
Takers and Matchers earn less than Net-Takers but that this effect decreases with age. This
is likely related to the explanations mentioned by us in the main text such as in-/outflux
of employees and leveling effects of collective bargaining agreements.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
Net-Takers 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.00136 -0.000917 -0.0217 -0.0360 -0.123 -0.402**
(0.0288) (0.0188) (0.0244) (0.120) (0.0950) (0.177)
Net-Givers 0.0161 0.00706 -0.0123 -0.0167 -0.154* -0.300*
(0.0276) (0.0156) (0.0218) (0.112) (0.0911) (0.174)
Age 0.0101*** 0.0108*** 0.0128*** 0.00956*** 0.00840*** 0.00758***
(0.00197) (0.00123) (0.00161) (0.00271) (0.00188) (0.00287)
Net-Takers × Age 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Matchers × Age 0.000810 0.00276 0.00812**
(0.00278) (0.00202) (0.00353)
Net-Givers × Age 0.000758 0.00358* 0.00618*
(0.00253) (0.00199) (0.00355)
Constant 10.49*** 10.40*** 9.965*** 10.51*** 10.51*** 10.24***
(0.107) (0.0788) (0.213) (0.130) (0.0934) (0.218)
b[Matchers] p=0.378 p=0.604 p=0.655 p=0.853 p=0.719 p=0.507
-b[Net-Givers]
b[Matchers | Age] . . . p=0.983 p=0.647 p=0.516
-b[Net-Givers | Age]
Socio Demographics X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Company Controls X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Career Dummies X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Dep. Dummies X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Observations 367 857 467 367 857 467
R2 0.785 0.752 0.746 0.785 0.752 0.749
Reg. Model Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Table 12: Regressions of Wage Levels on Cooperative Attitudes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For wage
increases, we use data from 2016/2017 for participants in 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants
in 2019. We use the value of financial award payments received in 2017 in percent of the 2017-wage level.
Asterisks for the control variables show the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint difference from zero.
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I Survey Outcomes and Cooperative Attitudes
In Table 13, we show OLS regression models of both variables on the share of Net-Takers,
Matchers, and Net-Givers in a work team, estimated using regressions with analytical
weights to account for team-specific participation rates . We detect no statistically relevant
relationship to the perception of team stability as shown in column (1). However, in
column (2), we find that members of teams that perceive themselves as being in a more
cohesive team tend to be more cooperative in the experiment.
(1) (2)
Team Stability Team Cohesion
Net-Taker Share -0.0438 -0.192
(0.423) (0.397)
Matcher Share -0.0709 -0.103
(0.299) (0.285)
Net-Giver Share -0.282 0.651**
(0.338) (0.272)
Constant 2.950*** 4.333***
(0.258) (0.255)
Socio-Demographics X X**
Company Controls X*** X
Career Dummies X X
Department Dummies X X
Observations 299 299
R2 0.076 0.046
Estimator WLS WLS
Table 13: Regressions of Team Cohesion on Team Composition
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; We use OLS with
analytical weights that emphasize averages of teams that participated with a higher share of team members.
We control for gender and age composition as well as average seniority. We do not control for career levels
or function compositions because of the large number of different categories.
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